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other human persons than nonhuman physical objects is promising. I 
hope someone will soon do a good job of defending them.! 
NOTES 
1. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I am grateful to Frances 
Howard-Snyder. 
The Problem of Hell, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. Pp.viii and 182. $24.95 (cloth). 
FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University 
An instance of the problem of evil, the problem of hell is particularly trou-
bling for theism, since hell is a terrible thing, the worst thing that can hap-
pen to anyone, and unlike other kinds of suffering, one for which the suffer-
er cannot be compensated in the long run. Why would a perfectly loving 
God permit people to suffer such evil? Why indeed would He condemn 
them to it? Jonathan Kvanvig explores the tension between hell and any 
form of theism which conceives of God as perfectly good. But he discusses 
the problem primarily from the point of view of Christianity. He motivates 
the problem by describing and rejecting a number of traditional accounts of 
hell. In the latter half of the book he offers an account of his own and 
attempts to show that it avoids the difficulties that faced the other accounts. 
He begins by discussing the 'strong view' of hell. This, he believes, is the 
standard view of hell, although he believes that scripture neither explicitly 
endorses it nor entails it. The strong view has four components: 
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned 
to hell; 
(H2) The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if 
they are consigned there; 
(H3) The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving hell 
and nothing one can do to change, or become in order to get out of 
hell, once one is consigned there; and 
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive 
in nature, hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those 
whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. [19] 
Interestingly, this list doesn't mention the fact that hell is unpleasant or oth-
erwise bad. Perhaps that is too obvious to need mentioning. He also 
assumes, but doesn't include here, that all human beings deserve hell. This 
claim makes trouble for the strong view, but he doesn't consider rejecting it. 
He discusses two versions of the strong view. The first (the 'equal punish-
ment version') claims that all sinners receive the same punishment; the sec-
ond (the 'differential punishment version') that, although all sinners receive 
everlasting punishment, some are made to suffer worse than others. He criti-
cizes the first as being both unfair and unjust, "unfair, because not everyone 
is equally guilty; unjust, because not all sin, if any, deserves an infinite pun-
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ishment" [27]. The unfairness might be easily remedied by shifting to the dif-
ferential version of hell, according to which more vicious sinners receive 
more severe punishment. But that leaves the objection that, no matter what a 
person did on earth, condemning her to everlasting suffering is unjust. 
What justifies us in imposing retributive punishment to some degree or 
other? The answer will have to do with how much harm has been done 
and with the intentions of the wrongdoer. But it seems that few of us (in 
fact, probably none of us) have done sufficient harm with sufficiently bad 
. intent to warrant infinite punishment. Some have argued all sin is sin 
against God and that, since God is greater than other beings, sin against 
God is correspondingly worse than sin against creatures. In fact, since God 
is infinitely good, sin against God is infinitely bad. 
Kvanvig agrees that all sin is sin against God (since God sustains the 
lives of all creatures an injury to one of them is a sin against Him - just as 
parents' intimate involvement with their baby means that an injury to the 
child injures them.) But he rejects the idea that "guilt is proportional to the 
status of the injured party." He supports this with human analogies. For 
example, the fact that Gandhi was a better person than some ordinary Joe 
wouldn't make it worse to slap Gandhi than Joe. 
Kvanvig spends much of his time elaborating and refuting the view, 
which derives from Jonathan Edwards, that all sinners are equally deserv-
ing of punishment because all sin is equally evil. He points out some sins 
are less evil than others, and even if all sins harm God, those sins which 
have God as their intentional object seem significantly worse than sins 
done by people who have no idea that God exists, or that their action will 
harm Him. But one needn't argue that all sin is equally deserving of the 
ultimate punishment in order to argue that all sinners are equally deserv-
ing. All one needs to argue is that there is a class of sins ('mortal sins,' per-
haps) such that we've all committed at least one member of this class and 
that one of them is enough to qualify one for the worst punishment. 
Moreover, Kvanvig notes that the strong view of hell doesn't require the 
equal punishment view. An advocate of the strong view can claim that the 
degree of punishment we deserve varies according to how much harm we 
cause and according to how malicious or indifferent our motives, but can 
still argue that each of those who will go to hell have committed sins so 
pernicious that she or he deserves some sort of everlasting punishment. 
Against the differential punishment version Kvanvig merely claims that 
"the intentions of the individual are of critical importance in determining 
the punishment due. If the death was an accident, perhaps no punishment 
is due. If the death was premeditated, a severe punishment is due" [62]. He 
believes, however, that the differential punishment version of the strong 
view "fails in that it ignores the intentional realm when assigning a basic 
sentence for a wrong done" [63]. 
But the differential version of the strong view needn't face this difficul-
ty. Its advocates could argue that each of us at some time or another com-
mits a sin which involves conscious deliberate rebellion against God. Some 
of these sins are worse than others, or some of us commit more such sins 
than others do, and that is why some of us deserve more severe punish-
ment than others, but all of us deserve some everlasting punishment. 
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Kvanvig points out that some of us don't even believe that God exists. For 
such people, fully conscious rebellion against God would not be possible. It 
isn't clear whether either of these claims is true. The second seems doubtful 
when one considers the atheist who claims, "I don't believe that God exists. 
But if he does, I hate Him!" However, if Kvanvig is right in thinking that 
some people are incapable of the ultimate rebellion against God, and even 
if no sin short of such rebellion deserves everlasting punishment, the advo-
cate of the strong view can hang onto the strong view and just drop the 
claim that all of us deserve to go to hell. 
K vanvig next investigates variants of the strong view of hell, each of 
which drops one of theses HI-H4. He elaborates these views in turn and 
raises difficulties for them. First there is the view which denies the Existence 
Thesis. This would be the view that hell is simply non-existence. Instead of 
suffering eternal damnation, sinners are condemned to annihilation. 
K vanvig finds this unpromising. Why should we prefer annihilation to eter-
nallife in hell? As long as we are gripped by a picture of hell as a place of 
torture, the answer is obvious. But, Kvanvig claims, hell needn't be like that. 
Clearly we needn't think of hell as a place of physical torture. But sup-
pose it is better to stay alive in hell than to be annihilated. Being in hell, 
then, is better than not existing, and better, presumably, than never having 
been born. But in that case, the problem of hell is less pressing than we 
thought initially. Certainly some human beings live lives which are so bad 
that the suffering in them outweighs the good in them, and of which we 
might well say that it would have been better for them had they never 
existed. In that case, hell would not be the worst thing that can happen to 
a person. Moreover, if one's existence in hell were better than no existence, 
the chief problem with hell would be that it isn't heaven, but God's failure 
to let everyone into heaven seems to beless problematic than His allowing 
some to suffer intolerably. So Kvanvig's objection to the annihilation 
account conflicts with his overall project. 
The second alternative denies the No Escape Thesis. It allows that, after 
our life on earth, we will have other chances to redeem ourselves from hell. 
Kvanvig objects that this doesn't solve the problem. If cutting off a thief's 
hand is an unjust punishment, then so is cutting off his hand unless he 
apologizes. 
The third alternative denies the Anti-Universalism Thesis. It claims that 
everyone is eventually reconciled to God and no-one ends up in hell. 
K vanvig discusses two versions of this view: contingent universalism and 
necessary universalism, and argues that both fail. According to contingent 
universalism, hell is contingently unoccupied, although it is possibly occu-
pied. Kvanvig raises the modal problem of hell for this view. God is not mere-
ly perfectly good, but necessarily perfectly good. If God's perfect goodness 
prevents Him from consigning people to hell, then His necessary perfect 
goodness prevents Him from consigning them to hell in any possible world. 
Necessary universalism, on the other hand, rules out human freedom. If 
we will necessarily be united with God, then we will necessarily be moral-
ly perfected, and hence, we will have no choice in the matter. Kvanvig dis-
cusses three objections to this argument: God could not create free beings 
who would ultimately reject Him, freedom is not as important as we have 
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sometimes thought and should be overridden if necessary to prevent ever-
lasting perdition; and no-one could freely reject God forever. Kvanvig 
responds to all three of these objections. I shall concentrate on his discus-
sion of the second. 
In response to the objection that God would justifiably override some-
one's freedom in order to prevent her from doing irreparable harm to her-
self, just as a loving father would justifiably prevent his daughter from 
committing suicide, Kvanvig argues that the mere fact that suicide is 
irreparable harm is not enough to justify interference. If the daughter really 
knows what she wants and would_not come to change her mind, and the 
father knows this, then he ought to let her go ahead. Of course, in almost 
every case, a father should prevent his child from committing suicide. But 
what is true of a human parent may not always be true of God. Human 
parents don't fully understand the minds of their children. They don't 
know exactly why their children are contemplating suicide, whether the 
decision is a rational one, whether they will come to change their minds 
later on (if they are rescued) and so on. Given this ignorance, they ought to 
err on the side of caution. But these constra,ints don't apply to God. "Hence 
the fact that sometimes freedom can be infringed upon legitimately does 
not show that God should infringe upon the freedom on any person head-
ed for hell..." [85]. 
Kvanvig points out that we don't always think it right to interfere with a 
suicide, for example, in the case of those who are dying and suffering 
intense and unending pain. One might object here that we respond this 
way because we recognize that the suffering is objectively horrible and that 
suicide would be the rational thing for anyone in those circumstances. 
Going to heaven, by contrast, is objectively better than going to hell. So we 
don't empathize with the sinner's choice, and hence, aren't inclined to 
judge it rational. Kvanvig believes that what justifies our non-interference 
is not simply the fact that death is objectively better than intense pain, but 
the patient's belief that it is and the fact that the belief is rational and stable. 
Kvanvig says it is crucial whether the suicidal person would agree that we 
should have intervened when he comes to see things more clearly. 
He says in a footnote that if God did override the freedom of the rebel-
lious, then she would either experience her chains as painful, as God 
would have to be constantly reining her in, or else God would have to do 
something equivalent to lobotomizing her, radically reducing her capaci-
ties, so that she was less than a full human being. 
This is false. Consider the state of one of the blessed in heaven, Joan of 
Arc, say. It seems plausible she is no longer free with respect to whether 
she loves God. She has freely formed her character in such a way that she 
is unable to reject God. Now consider Hitler, who we might plausibly sup-
pose to be in hell. But also suppose that he could have freely chosen to put 
himself into a situation like that of Joan. Consider the state that he would 
now be in as a result of such a free choice. That state would not involve 
present suffering, nor would it involve any reduction of his capacities, or 
dulling of his sensibilities, nor would it include the possibility of future 
rebellion. Now surely God could put Hitler into that state (or one that is 
molecule for molecule identical to that state). If He did so, Hitler's love 
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would not be freely given, and hence would be inferior to Joan's love, but 
Hitler would not suffer, nor would his capacities be reduced. The only dif-
ference between this Hitler and the one who (counterfactually) freely chose 
to love God, is an historical difference. This Hitler arrived at his heavenly 
state by a different (and less ideal) route than the other. Moreover, suppose 
God does do this. W ouldn' t the resultant Hitler come to thank God for 
doing so? If so, isn't this enough, by Kvanvig's criterion, to judge that 
God's interference was justified? 
The final simple alternative that Kvanvig considers abandons the view 
that hell is retribution for earthly sins. He discusses views according to 
which God does not put sinners into hell out of retribution, but they put 
themselves into hell by rejecting God. He writes: "On Swinburne's view, 
one's continued presence is hell is not due to something that occurred in 
the earthly past but rather to the present condition of having lost one's 
soul. One's residence in hell is eternal, not because one has done something 
to deserve it, but rather because it is impossible for one to achieve the alter-
ations required to leave"[991. 
But how, Kvanvig asks, is it impossible? Is God unable to change it? No. 
But if not, why is He justified in not doing so? Kvanvig agrees with 
Swinburne in rejecting the retribution thesis, but he thinks that the strong 
view needs a more fundamental overhauling. The retribution thesis seems 
in some kind of tension with God's love. Why does God create us? Because 
He is essentially loving. Why does God want us to go to heaven? Because 
He loves us and wants us to enjoy Him and to flourish. Why does God 
send sinners to hell? Because they are evil and God wants to punish them; 
or, because they deserve it and He is perfectly just. Kvanvig feels that these 
last answers jar in light of the answers to the first questions. 
Swinburne and others attribute two motives to God and offer no expla-
nation as to why one predominates in one case, but not in the other. 
Compare: Joe loves ice-cream, but he wants to lose weight. Why did he 
refuse to eat that ice-cream but eat this one? It is not enough to say that he 
refused the first ice-cream because he wanted to lose weight, and that he 
ate the second one because he loved ice-cream. A full explanation would 
explain why one desire overrode the other in each case. This is particularly 
urgent if one wants to explain the behavior of a perfectly rational agent. 
Kvanvig wants an explanation which will make God's treatment of the 
damned consistent with His treatment of the righteous, show how both 
issue from the same essential character, or give some explanation as to why 
one aspect of God's character motivates in one case but not in the other. 
Such an explanation would be "an issuant view of hell." In particular, he 
argues, the explanation must issue from God's love. This does not imply 
that God must ignore or abandon justice. "I am arguing for a hierarchical 
conception of the divine motivations, where God's love is His fundamental 
motivation regarding human beings and according to which God expends 
great effort to satisfy the demands of justice and holiness without abandon-
ing that love for us" [119]. 
In chapter 3, he gives a fuller account of issuant conceptions, and evalu-
ates two such conceptions: the first due to C. S. Lewis; the second to 
Eleonore Stump. Lewis says that sinners choose hell, by voluntarily surren-
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dering their will to their passions, and in the process, losing their humani-
ty. This is very dose to the view Kvanvig himself adopts, but he wonders 
why Lewis doesn't think that those in hell ultimately annihilate them-
selves. Lewis sees sinners in hell as becoming less and less human, in fact, 
simply becoming less and less. A natural extension of this is to see them as 
fading out of existence. But he is reluctant to go this route, probably 
because he feels it is unorthodox, and offers an argument which relies on 
something like the law of conservation of energy. Kvanvig rightly points 
out that such natural laws wouldn't limit God's power, and Lewis's 
thought here is inconsistent with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Stump 
elaborates the Thomistic picture of hell as a place of quarantine, where sin-
ners are kept isolated from the blessed. Aquinas believed that being is 
always better than non-being. Even if someone chose non-being, God is 
justified in overriding her choice and keeping her in existence. But if He is 
justified in overriding her free choice in order to keep her in the higher 
state of existence rather than non-existence, why isn't He justified in over-
riding her free choice by forcing her to live.in heaven? 
This raises a question which needs to be settled if one wants an ade-
quate account of hell: "the primary issue .. is whether freedom or existence 
is of fundamental importance" [137]. Kvanvig explores this question by 
considering two earthly analogies: is life-imprisonment or exile a less harsh 
punishment than death, and when, if ever, is one justified in allowing 
someone else to commit suicide? 
We tend to think that life-imprisonment is better than execution. This 
suggests that annihilating the damned is worse than putting (or leaving) 
them in hell. The analogy fails, however, as Kvanvig points out. Most mod-
ern prisons provide their inmates with many ingredients of a valuable life: 
decent food, company, reading materials, exercise, etc. If the choice were 
between execution and life with no possibility of parole in a prison where 
one was deprived of all the good things of life, for example, if prisoners 
were locked in a pitch black cell too small for movement without company, 
warmth, and so on, then death would be attractive. Presumably, hell 
would not contain any of the good things of life. 
At the same time, we sometimes think it overly paternalistic to prevent 
someone who has arrived at a completely rational decision to commit sui-
cide from doing so. Kvanvig thinks that someone who rejects God is choos-
ing suicide. Since God is omnipresent, to choose to be separated from God 
is to choose to be nowhere, hence, to choose not to exist (and also, he might 
argue, since God sustains all things in existence, to choose to be indepen-
dent from God is to choose not to be sustained in existence.) K vanvig 
thinks this choice might in some cases be rational. So God would be overly 
paternalistic in preventing people from destroying themselves. 
K vanvig's own view of hell emerges. He believes that hell is not a pun-
ishment which God imposes on sinners because of their sins. Instead, sin-
ners choose to reject God, to be independent from God. This choice, if 
taken to its logical extreme, leads to self-annihilation. God respects this 
choice, first, in not forcing Himself upon them, not changing their wills so 
that they cannot help but love Him. This leaves them in a state of rebellion 
against God, wretched, angry and confused. They stay in this state for as 
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long as it takes them to see their choices clearly and to come to a final ratio-
nal and settled choice between God and annihilation. If they never arrive at 
this final choice, they remain in this state forever. If they come to change 
their minds and decide to return to God, they do so. (It is unclear whether 
this ever happens or whether it is even possible.) If they do arrive at the 
final decision to reject God completely and so embrace non-existence, and 
it meets the requirements for rationality and God is in a position to judge 
that it meets the requirements, then God allows them to destroy them-
selves finally. (It is unclear whether this ever happens either.) 
If God's love would really direct Him to allow people to reject Him and 
prevent Him from forcing His love on them, then the same love would 
lead Him to respect their final choice to annihilate themselves. But would 
God's love direct Him to allow people to reject Him? Is it true that "In lov-
ing a person, one must be willing to suffer even total loss in allowing 
another to pursue what they most deeply want"? [153]. 
If you love someone and she wants something which will injure her, 
then you have to choose between respecting her autonomy and keeping 
her from harm. Which does love require that you choose? Suppose 
Kvanvig's five year old dislikes school and has a settled and (given his 
capacities) rational desire not to attend school, but to stay at home and 
watch TV and eat ice-cream. Obviously, loving a five year old requires that 
one look out for his interests rather than respect his autonomy. But why? 
Why is this the appropriate response when dealing with a five year old, 
but not the appropriate response when dealing with an adult (even a per-
verse and not very smart adult)? Is there something intrinsically satisfacto-
ry about the mental, social and psychological level of an eighteen year old 
which justifies our respecting her choices when we wouldn't respect the 
choices of her five year old brother? It isn't clear that there is. But there are 
two other important considerations. The first is that the five year old is 
going to grow up and see things a lot more reasonably, whereas the adult 
is not going to change much. We allow twenty-one year olds and even 
eighteen year olds to make their own decisions, but if a significant mental 
and physical development, comparable. to the development that occurs 
between five and eighteen, occurred between eighteen and thirty-one and 
then levelled off, it seems that we wouldn't allow eighteen year olds to 
make their own decisions, but would make thirty one the age of consent. 
Guardians of young children protect them until they reach their full devel-
opment, in part because it seems unfair to the potential adult to allow her 
future to be ruined by the immature person that she temporarily is. 
Another reason for the difference is that, except for the deranged and 
retarded, one adult is roughly on the same level of maturity as another, 
whereas an adult is clearly at a different level from the child. There is 
something objectionably patronizing about saying to another adult: "From 
my exalted position, I judge that your choice about what is in your interest 
is wrong." This seems inappropriate given the sort of equality and respect 
necessary to love between adults. But an adult can say something of this 
sort to a child without insulting him. So love in itself doesn't require 
respecting the choices of another. Other conditions have to be met as well. 
First, the beloved has to have reached roughly the final level of her devel-
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opment, and secondly, the beloved and the lover have to be on roughly the 
same level of maturity. But neither of these conditions seems to be met in 
the case at hand. If certain accounts of heaven are correct, our life there is 
not static but involves considerable development, as we get closer and 
closer to God. In that case, before one has entered heaven one has not 
reached anything like one's full potential. A ten year old hasn't reached his 
full potential and that seems to be a good part of why it would be wrong to 
allow him to destroy his mind with drugs. By the same token, human 
beings on earth Qr in hell haven't reached their full potential. Moreover, 
relative to God, human adults are like little children. There is nothing 
objectionably patronizing about a father saying to his five year old, "Sorry, 
kid. I know what's good for you. You're going to school whether you like it 
or not." Similarly there may be nothing objectionably patronizing about 
God saying to a human being, "Sorry, kid. I know what's good for you. 
You're going to heaven whether you like it or not." Indeed, Christians fre-
quently offer such explanations for why God doesn't answer our prayers, 
but instead allows us to suffer something horrible but character-forming. 
These two factors may justify God in forcing people into heaven if they 
refuse to go freely. (I am not here presupposing a geographic conception of 
heaven, as a place where God could keep the sinner, in spite of the fact that 
she hates being there. But I'm imagining God altering the sinner's will in 
such a way that she would unfreely love Him and enjoy being in heaven.) 
This line of argument will no doubt be repugnant to Kvanvig and to a 
number of writers on the problem of evil and the problem of divine hid-
denness, who appeal to the value of freedom to justify the fact that God 
allows hUH!an beings to suffer or to remain ignorant of Him. But what 
does the value of freedom consist in? And how great is this value? There is 
no doubt that freedom is valuable. Freely given love is better than coerced 
love. Freely arrived at virtue is better than coerced virtue. Suppose, as is 
plausible, thatthe highest state for human beings is to love God freely. God 
cannot guarantee that everyone attain this state. What, then, is the second 
best state for us: freely arrived at rebellion against God, or coerced love of 
God? Why should we think that the former is preferable? Does freedom 
have infinite va}ue, enpt£gh to outweigh. the infinite evil of eternal separa-
tion from God? WhyW6uld one thinkirnis? This question needs an answer. 
Here are a couple of suggestions. ' 
One direct response would defend the value of freedom, Perhaps one 
might argue that no-one could truly be said to love God freely if God were 
to guarantee that everyone would love Him in the end. If one cannot do 
otherwise than love God, then one does not love God freely. In that case, 
since the highest possible state for a human being is to love God freely, 
then perhaps God would be justified in allowing some to reject Him ulti-
mately in order to make the highest state possible for others, But the 
Principle of Alternate Possibilities is widely thought to be false, and it 
seems particularly implausible in this case. God could allow human beings 
a long time in which to choose whether to love Him freely, before interfer-
ing with their choices. Those who chose to love Him during this interim 
period would have chosen to do so freely, whereas those who rejected Him 
during this period would be capable only of the lesser 'coerced love.'! 
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Another response would reject the assumptions implied by the ques-
tions. One might argue that the questions embody the consequentialist 
assumption that a perfectly good God must produce the best of all possible 
worlds (available to Him). Together with the claim that coerced love is bet-
ter than free rejection and ultimate self-destruction, this implies that God 
would coerce people to love Him if they do not do so freely. Someone who 
rejects this consequentialist assumption might argue that there are certain 
constraints on what may morally be done in pursuit of the best available 
state of affairs. These constraints are imposed by love itself. Perfect love 
involves respect for the autonomy of the beloved which prevents the lover 
from interfering even for the good of the beloved. I suspect that Kvanvig 
would take this line, but in that case, he needs to respond to the argument I 
mounted earlier. Respect for autonomy is not an absolute constraint. It 
doesn't apply in the case of children, and the reasons it does apply in the 
case of love between adults may not transfer to the case of love between 
God and human beings. I think more work needs to be done in this area. 
In spite of my complaints about his arguments, I find Kvanvig's account 
attractive in a number of ways. He explains heaven and hell in terms of 
God's love for His creatures. This makes God's behavior rational, consis-
tent and comprehensible. It also makes Him look less vindictive than some 
of the competing conceptions do. It explains the Christian notion that belief 
in God (in the sense of commitment to God) is necessary and (given certain 
background conditions) sufficient for salvation.2 It explains why heaven 
and hell constitute the only two ultimate destinies for human beings. 
Alternative accounts make it appear arbitrary that those are the only two 
options. 
The book is very well-organized and contains many arguments about 
side-issues, such as .divine command morality, which I haven't discussed 
here. Most of the arguments are very good and are interesting in their own 
right apart from the contribution they make to the book's conclusion. I 
highly recommend this book.3 
NOTES 
1. If you think' coerced love' is a contradiction in terms, then imagine God 
coerces people into a state which is molecule for molecule identical with love 
except that it is not freely arrived at. 
2. It may be objected that if God's love, by itself, makes it the case that 
commitment to God is necessary and sufficient for salvation, then Christ's life, 
suffering and death seem unnecessary. 
3. I am grateful to Daniel Howard-Snyder for discussion of the issues 
involved here and to Jonathan Kvanvig for comments. 
